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Abstract—A two-ray multipath model for frequency diverse
array (FDA)-based directional modulation (DM) is proposed in
multi-input single-output multi-eavesdropper (MISOME) wiretap
channels for the first time. The excitation factors of the FDA and
the weighting coefficients of the inserted artificial noise (AN) are
jointly designed in a way which imposes no impact on the desired
receiver while simultaneously distorting the received signals of
eavesdroppers. Secrecy rate is analyzed for the proposed two-ray
multipath FDA-based DM model. Numerical simulations verify
the capability of physical layer secure (PLS) transmissions of
the proposed FDA-DM model in two-ray multipath MISOME
wiretap channels.
Index Terms—Directional modulation; physical layer security;
frequency diverse array; multi-path; secrecy rate; MISOME.
I. INTRODUCTION
Compared with the conventional phased arrays (PA)-based
directional modulation (DM) technology [1][2], the frequency
diverse arrays (FDA)-based DM scheme is a newly proposed
technology with the advantage of wireless physical layer
secure (PLS) transmissions not only in the angle dimension
but also in the range dimension.
FDA technology was first proposed in [3], which applied a
small frequency increment across the antenna elements and
thus produced a range-angle-dependent beampattern. After-
wards, the work in [4] divided the FDA elements into multiple
subarrays and optimized the transmit beamspace matrix with
convex optimization for the purpose of range and angle estima-
tions of targets. An improved FDA radar with logarithmically
increasing frequency increments was generalized in [5], which
obtained a beampattern with a single maximum at the target
location. Multiple carriers were combined with FDA in [6]
to generate a more focused dot-shaped beampattern. The
authors in [7] proposed the random frequency diverse array for
uncoupled range-angle indication in active sensing. A focused
beampattern synthesis was put forward in [8] by optimizing
the frequency increments with the genetic algorithm, where
both single-dot and multidot-shaped transmit beampatterns
can be synthesized. Recently, the work in [9] reviewed the
developments of the FDA technology.
Owing to the favorable characteristic that the beampattern
is both range and angle dependent, FDA technology, in recent
years [10]-[16], has been applied into DM synthesis for
wireless PLS transmissions. Specifically, the authors in [10]
achieved directional modulation synthesis using the FDA with
linearly increasing frequency increments. The FDA with sym-
metrically and non-linearly increasing frequency increments
was used in [11] to decouple range and angle dependent
transmit beampattern for wireless DM transmissions. The work
in [12] explored the FDA with random frequency increments
for DM transmissions. The time-modulated FDA was utilized
in [13] to perform wireless PLS transmissions in free space.
Additionally, the work in [14] showed that FDA-based DM is
still achievable in Nakagami-m fading channels. The spread
spectrum technology was combined with orthogonal FDA
in [15] to achieve multi-beam DM synthesis in free space.
Recently, the work in [16] generalized the wireless PLS trans-
missions based on FDA technology for proximal legitimate
user and eavesdropper.
The above-mentioned FDA-based DM schemes [10]-[16],
however, mainly focused on wireless PLS transmissions in
single-path environments without considering multipath ef-
fects. Although some works explored the multipath character-
istics of the FDA, such as [17], they did not provide any inves-
tigations about the possibility of applying the FDA method into
DM transmissions in such multipath environments. To the best
of our knowledge, no work is available in the present literature
with respect to the capability of wireless PLS transmissions
of the FDA-based DM technology in multipath environments.
This paper is dedicated, for the first time, to extending
the FDA-based DM scheme into multipath environments by
proposing a simplified two-ray multipath FDA-DM model
in multi-input single-output multi-eavesdropper (MISOME)
wiretap channels.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II elaborates the main principles of the proposed two-ray
multipath FDA-DM model in MISOME wiretap channels.
The secrecy rate of the proposed two-ray multipath FDA-DM
model is analyzed in Section III. Simulations about bit error
rate (BER) and secrecy rate are provided in Section IV. Finally,
Section V makes conclusions for the whole paper.
Notations: Throughout the paper, scalars and vectors are
denoted by italic lower-case letters and arrowed bold lower-
case letters, respectively. The operator “·” stands for the
product of two vectors. E(∗) means the expectation operation
of a random variable, while CN (0, σ2) refers to the complex
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Fig. 1. The proposed two-ray multipath FDA-based DM model in MISOME wiretap channels.
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance σ2. The
unit vectors along the x, y and z-axes of the Cartesian coor-
dinate system are represented by ~ex, ~ey and ~ez , respectively.
The expression, ~r := (r, θ, ψ), refers to an arbitrary spatial
point/vector ~r with coordinates (r, θ, ψ) in the polar coordinate
system. Additionally, ~er is the unit vector of ~r.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider an MISOME wiretap model
where one transmitter (Alice) with multiple antennas is trying
to transmit confidential information to one desired legitimate
receiver (Bob), while V anonymous passive eavesdroppers
(Eves) are trying to intercept the confidential information.
Alice is composed of a symmetrical (2N+1)-element FDA
with equal element spacing d, which is set as half wavelength
of the central carrier. These elements are 1-D linearly arrayed
on the x-axis with the same height h0 away from the ground.
Thus, the position vector of the n-th (n = −N, · · · , 0, · · · , N )
element can be expressed as
~rAnten = dn~ex + h0~ez (1)
where dn = nd is the x-axis coordinate of the n-th element.
The radiated frequency of the n-th element is designed as
fn = f0 + ∆fn = f0 + ∆f ln(|n|+ 1)g (2)
where f0 is the central radiated frequency, ∆f refers to a fixed
frequency increment satisfying |∆f |  f0, and g represents
an additional factor to control the frequency increments.
Let Ω denote the alphabet of the normalized baseband
modulation symbols with size |Ω| = M . Then the n-th antenna
element of Alice’s FDA is fed with the following signal,
xn =
√
Ps (β1s+ β2bnz) (3)
where Ps indicates the total transmitting power; s ∈ Ω is the
normalized baseband modulation symbol with E(|s|2) = 1;
z ∼ CN (0, 1) represents the circularly symmetric random
complex Gaussian artificial noise (AN); bn denotes the com-
plex weight coefficient of the AN feeding on the n-th element;
β1 and β2 are power splitting factors for the useful signal and
the AN, respectively, which satisfy the following constraint,
β21 + β
2
2 = 1 (4)
It is assumed that an arbitrary observation point is located
at ~r = r~er := (r, θ, ψ), where r, θ and ψ represent the
distance from the coordinate origin to the observation point,
the elevation and azimuth angles, respectively. In such a two-
ray multipath model, there exist two transmission paths for
the signal transmitting from the n-th antenna element to the
observation point. The first one is the direct line-of-sight (LoS)
path~rLoSn , and the second is the reflected non-LoS (NLoS) path
~rNLoSn . Geometrically, the length of the direct LoS path ~r
LoS
n
can be calculated by [17]
rLoSn ≈ r − ~er ·~rAnten = r − dnu− h0v (5)
where u , cos θ cosψ and v , sin θ.
To facilitate analysis, we suppose that the ground plane is
infinite and perfectly conducting, so that the image theory
is applicable. Therefore, the NLoS path can be equivalently
regarded as an LoS path radiated from the image FDA, as
shown in Fig. 1. This means that the length of the NLoS
path from the n-the element to the observation point can be
calculated by
rNLoSn ≈ r − dnu+ h0v (6)
For the sake of convenient analysis, we consider the normal-
ized LoS channel in free space, and ignore the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN), ξ ∼ CN (0, σ2ξ ). Then the received
signal at an arbitrary observation point ~r via the normalized
LoS channel can be expressed in (7), where an = ejφn is the
excitation factor for the n-th element of the FDA.
For clarity, letting
µn = exp
{
j2pif0
(
−r − dnu
c
)}
(8a)
εn = exp
{
j2pi∆fn
(
t− r − dnu
c
)}
(8b)
yLoS(~r) =
N∑
n=−N
anxn exp
{
j2pifn
(
t− r
LoS
n
c
)}
=
N∑
n=−N
anxn exp
{
j2pifn
(
t− r − dnu− h0v
c
)}
(7a)
=
N∑
n=−N
anxn exp
{
j2pi (f0 + ∆fn)
(
t− r − dnu
c
)}
exp
{
j
2pifnh0v
c
}
(7b)
= exp {j2pif0t}
N∑
n=−N
anxn exp
{
j2pif0
(
−r − dnu
c
)}
exp
{
j2pi∆fn
(
t− r − dnu
c
)}
exp
{
j
2pifnh0v
c
}
(7c)
TABLE I
ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION FOR an AND bn SATISFYING (15) WITH N = 3
n −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
an 0.998 + 0.050j 0.516 + 0.857j 0.384 + 0.923j −0.955 + 0.296j −0.996− 0.091j 0.979− 0.204j 0.222− 0.975j
bn 0.286− 0.958j −0.938 + 0.346j 0.535− 0.845j −0.949 + 0.315j −0.995 + 0.105j −0.971− 0.238j −0.336 + 0.942j
then the received LoS signal in (7c) can be written as
yLoS(~r) = exp {j2pif0t}
N∑
n=−N
anxnµnεn exp
{
j
2pifnh0v
c
}
(9)
Similarly, the received signal at the observation point ~r via
the normalized NLoS channel is
yNLoS(~r) = −
N∑
n=−N
anxn exp
{
j2pifn
(
t− r
NLoS
n
c
)}
≈ −
N∑
n=−N
anxn exp
{
j2pifn
(
t− r − dnu+ h0v
c
)}
= − exp {j2pif0t}
N∑
n=−N
anxnµnεn exp
{
−j 2pifnh0v
c
}
(10)
The total received signal at the observation point ~r can be
obtained by adding the LoS signal in (9) and the NLoS signal
in (10), which is expressed in (11). For clarity, we let
ρn = j2 sin
(
2pifnh0v
c
)
(12)
Then the total received signal in (11c) can be further simplified
as (13), where 
κ ,
N∑
n=−N
anµnεnρn (14a)
η ,
N∑
n=−N
anbnµnεnρn (14b)
In order to achieve a secure DM transmission from Al-
ice to Bob, the next work is how to design the excitation
factors of the FDA {an} and the weight coefficients of the
inserted AN {bn}. By doing so, only Bob can acquire the
useful information while Eves’ received signals are severely
distorted, thus providing transmission security between Alice
and Bob. We suppose that the location information of Bob, ~rB
:= (rB, θB, ψB), is prior known for Alice, and then the design
methodologies for {an} and {bn} are given as
κB =
N∑
n=−N
anµ
B
nε
B
nρ
B
n = 1 (15a)
ηB =
N∑
n=−N
anbnµ
B
nε
B
nρ
B
n = 0 (15b)
where µBn , ε
B
n , and ρ
B
n are calculated by substituting (r, θ, ψ) =
(rB, θB, ψB) into (8) and (12).
There are multiple solutions for (15), one of which is shown
in Table I with N = 3. If the solution sets of {an} and
{bn} are denoted by A and B, respectively, the dynamic DM
transmission can be achieved by dynamically and randomly
generating {an} ∈ A and {bn} ∈ B at symbol rate level. Once
{an} and {bn} are generated with the constraint of (15), the
total received signal of Bob can be simplified to
yTotal(~rB) =
√
Psβ1κ
Bs+
√
Psβ2η
Bz =
√
Psβ1s (16)
where only the useful signal is left while the inserted AN
is eliminated. Therefore, Bob can easily recover the original
confidential information from the received signal.
However, by contrast, the received signals of Eves at dif-
ferent locations from Bob will deteriorate seriously. Actually,
on the one hand, the received useful signals of Eves are dis-
torted owning to the non-accomplishment of the normalization
property in (15a); on the other hand, the received signals of
Eves are severely interfered by the AN due to the failure of the
orthogonal property in (15b). Therefore, Eves cannot intercept
the confidential information, which guarantees the security of
the confidential transmission from Alice to Bob.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
BER and secrecy rate are widely used in DM-related
literature to measure the performance of DM systems. The
BER of DM systems was fully investigated in [18], which also
yTotal(~r) = yLoS(~r) + yNLoS(~r) (11a)
= exp {j2pif0t}
N∑
n=−N
anxnµnεn exp
{
j
2pifnh0v
c
}
− exp {j2pif0t}
N∑
n=−N
anxnµnεn exp
{
−j 2pifnh0v
c
}
(11b)
= exp {j2pif0t}
N∑
n=−N
j2anxnµnεn sin
(
2pifnh0v
c
)
LP
=
N∑
n=−N
j2anxnµnεn sin
(
2pifnh0v
c
)
(11c)
yTotal(~r) =
N∑
n=−N
anxnµnεnρn =
N∑
n=−N
an
√
Ps (β1s+ β2bnz)µnεnρn (13a)
=
√
Psβ1s
N∑
n=−N
anµnεnρn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Useful Signal
+
√
Psβ2z
N∑
n=−N
anbnµnεnρn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Artificial Noise
,
√
Psβ1κs︸ ︷︷ ︸
Useful Signal
+
√
Psβ2ηz︸ ︷︷ ︸
Artificial Noise
(13b)
holds for the proposed two-ray multipath FDA-DM model.
Here we will analyze the secrecy rate of the proposed two-ray
multipath FDA-DM model.
When the total received signal in (13b) is polluted by the
AWGN, ξ ∼ CN (0, σ2ξ ), the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) γ at
an arbitrary observation point ~r can be calculated by
γ(~r) =
Psβ
2
1 |κ|2
σ2ξ
(17)
Correspondingly, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) λ at the observation point ~r can be calculated by
λ(~r) =
Psβ
2
1 |κ|2
Psβ22 |η|2 + σ2ξ
(18)
Therefore, the achievable rate ζ at an arbitrary observation
point ~r can be written as
ζ(~r) = log2{1 + λ(~r)} (19)
Especially, the achievable rate of Bob can be obtained by
substituting (15) into (18) and (19), i.e.,
ζ(~rB) = log2
{
1 +
Psβ
2
1
σ2ξ
}
(20)
We further presume that the V eavesdroppers are located at
~rEν := (r
E
ν , θ
E
ν , ψ
E
ν ), and they are different from Bob’s location,
which means ~rEν 6= ~rB for ∀ ν ∈ {1, 2, · · · , V }. Then, the
achievable rate of the ν-th Eve, ζ(~rEν ), can be obtained by
substituting ~r = ~rEν into (19).
Accordingly, the secrecy rate of the proposed two-ray mul-
tipath FDA-DM model, ζsec, can be calculated by
ζsec =
[
min
ν∈{1,··· ,V }
{
ζ(~rB)− ζ(~rEν )
}]+
(21)
where [∗]+ = max{0, ∗}.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The simulation parameters are selected as f0 = 10 GHz,
∆f = 2 kHz, g = 1, (rB, θB, ψB) = (150km, 40◦, 70◦), h0 =
4.25λ0 = 4.25c/f0, Ps = 1, γ = 10 dB, and pi/4-QPSK,
respectively. The locations of the Eves in our simulations are
randomly generated.
Fig. 2(a)-(c) show the BER performances of the single-path
and the proposed multipath FDA-based DM models versus
range r, elevation angle θ, and azimuth angle ψ, respectively.
Two observations can be obtained from Fig. 2: a) The BER
lobe of the proposed multipath model is narrower than the
single-path model, which means that a more focused secure
area can be achieved via the proposed multipath model; b)
As expected, larger N and smaller β1 can result in narrower
BER lobe, which holds for both single-path and the proposed
multipath models. Practically, in order to realize narrower
BER selection, the number of array elements and the power
splitting factor should be properly chosen via weighing the
array complexity and power efficiency.
The secrecy rate of the proposed two-ray multipath FDA-
based DM model versus SNR (dB) is depicted in Fig. 3 (a). As
expected, it shows that the secrecy rate of the proposed two-ray
multipath FDA-based DM model increases with larger SNR,
smaller β1, and smaller number of Eves. Since the anonymous
Eve may locate anywhere in free space, we further simulate
the secrecy rates of the multipath and the single-path FDA-DM
models versus Eve’s location, as shown in Fig. 3 (b) and (c),
respectively. Comparing Fig. 3 (b) and (c), it is again verified
that the proposed multipath FDA-DM model can achieve more
focused secure area than the single-path model.
V. CONCLUSION
We investigated the ability of wireless physical layer secure
transmission of an example frequency diverse array-based
directional modulation system in two-ray multipath environ-
ments. The analytical methodology and numerical simulations
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2. BER performances versus (a) range r, (b) elevation angle θ, and (c) azimuth angle ψ for the single-path and the proposed multipath FDA-DM models.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 3. Secrecy rate of the proposed multipath FDA-based DM model. (a) Secrecy rate versus SNR (dB); (b) Secrecy rate versus Eve’s location (Multipath);
(c) Secrecy rate versus Eve’s location (Single path).
verified that the proposed FDA-DM model is capable of
wireless PLS transmission in two-ray multipath MISOME
wiretap channels, which outperforms the single-path model
in terms of more focused secure area.
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